University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Management Papers

Wharton Faculty Research

2002

Economic Governance in an Electronically Networked Global
Economy
Stephen J. Kobrin
University of Pennsyvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, and the Economics
Commons

Recommended Citation
Kobrin, S. J. (2002). Economic Governance in an Electronically Networked Global Economy. The
Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, 43-75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
CBO9780511491238.004

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/19
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Economic Governance in an Electronically Networked Global Economy
Disciplines
Business Administration, Management, and Operations | Economics

This book chapter is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/19

ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN AN ELECTRONICALLY NETWORKED GLOBAL
ECONOMY*
Stephen J. Kobrin
Department of Management, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
“Geographical space as a source of explanation affects all historical realities, all spatially defined
phenomena; states, societies, cultures and economies.”1
In the Westphalian state system the basic unit of economic governance is the national market
defined, as is the sovereign state, in terms of mutually exclusive geographic jurisdiction. Economic
governance -- attempts to exert authority over economies and economic actors -- is exercised through
borders and territorial jurisdiction.
In this chapter I argue that the emerging global world economy compromises the effectiveness of
national market-based economic governance. As the minimal spatial extent of product markets grows
larger than the geographic scope of the larger national markets, the latter no longer remain viable as basic
units in the world economy. As an electronically networked world economy renders economic borders
less meaningful, jurisdiction loses significance. As markets are increasingly constructed in cyberspace,
control through control over territory becomes problematic.
In contrast, an international or cross-border world economy comprised of a system of interconnected, geographically defined, national markets does not necessarily compromise territorial control.
Although jurisdictional ambiguity or conflict may make economic governance more difficult, regulation
and taxation through territorial national markets remains viable.
Globalization entails a systemic change in the organization of economics (and politics) comparable
in scope to the transition from the feudal epoch the modern or Westphalian system in Europe roughly
four hundred years ago. I argue that three related and interwoven characteristics of the emerging global
economy are particularly problematic for authority exercised through spatially defined national markets.
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1. The scale of technology in many strategic industries (its cost, risk and complexity) renders the
minimal effective market size larger than that of even the largest national markets;
2. Networks are replacing hierarchies and markets as a basic form of economic organization. The
diffuse, non-centered and relational character of networks is not consistent with economic authority
exercised through bounded and discrete geographic territory; and
3. The migration of markets to cyberspace (or some combination of physical and virtual space) renders
geographic space problematic as a basis for effective economic governance.
As many authors have pointed out “we have been there and done that,” this is actually the second
global economy or second wave of globalization.2 The first global economy which dates roughly from
1870 to 1914 has been called “the high water mark” of an open, integrated international economy and the
“golden age” of international economic integration.3
Pre-1914 levels of international trade and investment were striking; world trade grew by almost
50% per decade from the mid-nineteenth to early twentieth century and international capital investments
by 64% per decade during the forty years before World War I. By most measures the degree of
internationalization of the first global economy compares favorably with that of the current or second.
To cite one relative comparison, at their late twentieth century peak Japan’s capital exports (relative to
GDP) were only about half of Great Britain’s at the turn of the century.4
That being said, there is no question that current “global” economy differs significantly from that
of a century ago. First, it is broader in terms of the number of national markets encompassed (albeit to
varying degrees) as constituent units. Second, it is deeper in terms of the density of interaction, of flows
of trade and investment, than it was prior to 1914.
Third, and perhaps most important, the dominant mode of organization of international economic
transactions changed significantly in the late twentieth century from the market (trade and portfolio
investment) to hierarchy or the internationalization of production through the MNE.5 By the late 1990s,
60,000 Transnational Corporations with over 500,000 foreign affiliates accounted for about 25% of
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global output. The United Nations Programme on Transnationals concluded that “...international
production … is at the core of the process of globalization”.6
That still begs the critical question: does globalization define a change in degree or kind. Does it
represent an extension of the modern international world economy into somewhat unfamiliar territory or a
systemic transformation which entails both changes in quantity and quality, defining new structures and
new modes of functioning? Does globalization define a fundamental change in the mode of organization
of the world economy?
While there is general agreement that major changes in the scope and organization of international
economic activities are taking place, considerable disagreement over their interpretation remains.7 Some
argue that the interrelated economic and technological developments which are emerging as critical
components of globalization will result in deep structural adjustments, leading to a major periods of
change, perhaps epochal in nature.8 The French author and politician Jean-Marie Guehenno, for example,
links emerging global networks with the death of nation states and the state structure.9
Others claim that all that has ended is what Eric Hobsbawm calls the “Age of Extremes,” the
economic dislocations and mass destruction--real or threatened--which have characterized the “short”
twentieth century from 1914 to the end of the Cold War in 1991.10 One implication of this line of
argument is that with the end of the “age of extremes” we are now able to return to the open,
international world economy of the early twentieth century; that what appears to be dramatic change is
actually a return to normalcy. Thus, Alan Blinder, who was then Vice-Chairman of the Federal Reserve
observed that “...a great deal of what we have been witnessing since 1950 is simply getting the world
back to the level of integration that had been achieved in 1914”.11
The underlying issue, however, is not whether the level or rate of growth of trade and investment
or interdependence are greater in 2000 than they were in 1900. It is whether a qualitative structural
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change is taking place and that cannot be demonstrated by quantitative arguments involving crosstemporal comparisons of economic data.12
Put differently, is the current global world economy merely “more” international or does it entail a
deep change in political-economic structure? If the distinction is to have meaning, it is important to be
precise about definitions. International is a relatively new word dating from the late eighteenth century,13
a modern concept which was not relevant before the emergence of territorially defined nation-states and
national markets. An international economy links discrete, mutually exclusive, geographic national
markets through cross-border flows of trade and investment.
“The world-wide international economy is one in which the principal entities are nation states, and
involves the process of the growing interconnection between national economies...[it] is an aggregate of
nationally-located functions”.14 An international economy is unambiguously modern; it involves relations
between sovereign units of the Westphalian state system and hierarchically structured, often vertically
integrated, discrete economic actors. It is profoundly geographic in that borders of states and markets
are of the essence.
The internationalization of production is not necessarily inconsistent with this framework: MNEs
are seen by many observers as national firms with a clear center or home country which engage in
international operations and require access to territory to function. At the end of the day, MNEs are
international or cross-border entities which are of the existing interstate system and are firmly rooted in
national jurisdiction.
In contrast globalization entails a qualitative transformation of the international world economy.
As noted above, the argument is based on three related propositions. First, dramatic increases in the
scale of technology in many industries--in its cost, risk and complexity--have rendered even the largest
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national markets too small to be meaningful economic units; they are no longer the “principal entities” of
the world economy. National markets are fused transnationally rather than linked across borders.
Second, the recent explosion of transnational strategic alliances is a manifestation of a
fundamental change in the mode of organization of international economic transactions from markets
and/or hierarchies (i.e., trade and MNEs) to global networks. Last, and related to the second point, the
emerging global economy (and many emerging global political actors) is digitally integrated and entails
the migration of markets from geographic to cyberspace.
My primary interest in this chapter is the impact of globalization of the world economy on
economic governance, on national markets and nation states. I argue that globalization compromises the
basic symmetry of political and economic organization, of nation states and national markets,
characteristic of much of the twentieth century.
An asymmetry of geographic scope is emerging as economic units (markets) expand in space well
beyond the limits of political units (national territories). More important is the emerging asymmetry in
mode of organization as interstate politics remains geographically grounded in the sovereign territorially
while major sectors of the world economy (and many significant non-state actors) are organized in terms
of non-territorial electronic networks. Geographic space is losing meaning as the basis for the
organization of markets. As a result, geographically rooted economic governance has become
problematic and non-state or private actors are increasingly involved in authoritative decision-making.15
The next section of this chapter deals with three components of globalization in some
considerable detail: the scale of technology; alliances and cross-border networks; and the movement of
markets to cyberspace. I then turn to networks and a mode of economic organization and the emergence
of a networked global economy. Implications for states and the state system will then be discussed. The
chapter concludes with some thoughts about possible futures.
5

COMPONENTS OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION
Scale of Technology
Markets, as well as economic governance, are typically conceptualized in spatial or geographic
terms. In his Principles, Marshall quotes Cournot to define a market as “not any particular market place
in which things are bought and sold, but the whole of any region in which buyers and sellers are in such
free intercourse with one another that the prices of the same goods tend to equality easily and quickly”
(emphasis added).16
That raises a pertinent but little considered question: Why should markets spread geographically
beyond a local area or region? The simplest explanation, and the oldest, is that the supply of some goods
is found in one locale and their demand in another: e.g., precious metals, spices and petroleum. The
geographic expansion of markets also allows for a more productive division of labor: “Smithian” gains
from specialization, exploitation of differences in resource endowments, and the adaptation of skills.17
Last, spreading fixed capital costs over a larger market area can reduce unit costs and produce
gains from scale. The application of science and technology to production processes and products
towards the end of the 19th century provided an irresistible motive for the geographic expansion of
markets. Firms found that the need for larger production runs to achieve economies of scale and, later,
the demands of competitive research and development budgets, mandated expansion of the geographic
bounds of markets.
In most transnationally integrated industries internationalization is driven by scale rather than
specialization; a process Kenichi Ohmae characterizes as a dramatic shift from a variable to a fixed cost
environment has occurred.18 He notes that in a number of critical industries, the scale of production
and/or technology have increased to the point where fixed costs must be amortized over a larger market
base than is available in even the largest national markets.
6

While “Smithian” expansion is consistent with an international world economy, expansion driven
by scale, and especially technological scale, may not be. An international world economy is constructed
through the mutual interconnection or cross-border integration of national economic spaces. As Manuel
Castells notes, a global economy is something different, “it is an economy with the capacity to work as a
unit in real time on a planetary basis.”19 An international economy links distinct national markets; a global
economy fuses national markets into a coherent whole.
Furthermore, at this point it is the cost and risk of technology rather than the need for larger
production runs that is the primary motivation for the transnational integration of markets. In many
strategic industries international expansion is required to fully amortize the enormous research and
development expenses associated with rapidly evolving process and product technology. There are only
a few industries (e.g., automobiles and construction equipment) in which the fixed costs of manufacture
are the motivation for international market integration, and even there developments such as computer
aided design/manufacture and flexible production are reducing rapidly the number of units needed to fully
exploit scale economies.
While the point is difficult to “prove,” F.M. Scherer has concluded that in only a very small
minority of industries is concentration approaching oligopoly at the national level justified by production
scale economies in the U.S. market.20 In a previous study, Kobrin found that technological intensity was
the primary determinant of the transnational integration of U.S. firms and that proxies for manufacturing
scale were not significant.21
On the other hand, there is no question that the cost, risk, and pace of technological development
have increased significantly over the past four decades. For example, constant dollar research and
development expenditures for U.S. industry increased almost five and one-half fold between 1953 and
1990; they increased 150 percent between 1980 and 1990 alone.22 In fact, with the exception of the early
7

1970s and the early 1990s, non-Federal constant dollar R&D expenditures have grown at an annual rate
of well over six percent over the last four decades.23 Research and development spending as a percentage
of sales for U.S. industry doubled in the sixteen years between 1976 and 1992: from 1.9 to 3.8 percent.24
As the extent of a company's research and development effort is mandated by the nature of its
technology and competition rather than its size, this rapid growth of spending requires a corresponding
expansion of sales--and ultimately, internationalization--if profitability is to be maintained.25 Put another
way, it is impossible to maintain a competitive level of R&D expenditure in industries such as
pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, telecommunications, or aerospace based upon sales in even the largest
national market. Firms must sell very similar products in a number of the larger markets to remain
players in the industry. In that sense, the marked increase in the cost, risk and complexity of technology
over the last decades of the twentieth century has fused markets globally rather than linked them
internationally, at least in these strategic, technology intensive, industries.
At this point it appears that the global integration of markets by a single firm may no longer be
sufficient to offset the huge costs and risks of technological development in a number of strategic
industries. The last decade has seen an exponential increase in technology driven collaborative
agreements or strategic alliances among leading multinationals from the major industrial countries.

Strategic Alliances
Strategic alliances are relevant for two reasons. First, in many instances they are an indicator that the
scale of technology--the cost, risk and complexity of research and development--has grown to the point
where it is beyond the reach of even the largest and most global firms. Second, alliances are a
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manifestation of the emergence of a networked global economy; they represent a change in the mode of
organization of international economic transactions.
Although comprehensive data on alliances do not exist, virtually every attempt at data gathering
reveals their dramatic growth over the last two decades; one study estimated a 31% compound annual
growth rate for the number of high technology alliances over the 1980s.26 Booz Allen & Hamilton reports
that alliance-generated sales among the Fortune 1000 grew from less than 2% in 1980, to 19% by 1996
and they are projected to be 35% by 2002.27
The vast majority of alliances are triad based; most studies find that over 90% of all agreements
are between firms from North America, Europe and Japan.28 Alliances also tend to be concentrated in a
limited number of industries: typically automobiles and high technology sectors such as pharmaceuticals,
biotechnology, aerospace, information technology, and new materials.29 A single firm in these industries
often enters into very large numbers of alliances: in the last half of the 1990s, IBM formed about 800
alliances, AT&T 400 and Hewlett Packard 300.30
The motivations for strategic alliances are complex and varied.31 One is clearly global market
access: the need to compete in all major markets, or at least in all the legs of the triad, simultaneously. A
second reflects the continued importance of national boundaries: government preferences for “local”
firms in industries such as aerospace where an alliance with a national or regional firm may be a necessary
requisite of sales to either the military or a national airline. Third, one can never dismiss an interest in
making competition less onerous as a motive for collaboration.32
The most important motivation for alliance formation, however, is the increasing cost, risk and
complexity of technology.33 Even the world’s largest and most international firms can no longer “bet the
company” on the next generation of semiconductors or jumbo jets; in many industries the cost of a
competitive R&D budget has risen to the point where it is no longer possible to “go it alone.” An
9

example is provided by the alliance between IBM, Siemens and Toshiba to develop a 256 megabyte chip
motivated by the need to share an estimated $1 billion in development costs and the large associated
risks.34
Perhaps more important, technologies have become so complex and rapidly changing that even
industry leaders cannot master them internally. An analysis of over four thousand strategic alliances
where innovation or an exchange of technology represented at least part of the agreement concluded that
“...cooperation has to be understood in the light of attempts made by companies to cope with the
complexity and the interrelatedness of different fields of technology and their efforts to gain time and
reduce uncertainty in joint undertakings during a period of technological uncertainty. Other motives
appear to play a very limited role”.35
In summary, the evidence strongly suggests that the minimum size of markets needed to support
technological development in industries such as aerospace, semiconductors and pharmaceuticals is now
larger than the largest national markets. Furthermore, in some industries single firm internationalization
no longer appears sufficient as even the largest multinationals must cooperate to deal with the cost, risk
and complexity of technology.36 Alliances represent a transformation of the mode of organization of
international economic transactions from hierarchically structured MNEs to networks. This has
important implications for the viability of territorially defined national markets and geographically ordered
economic governance which will be discussed in detail below.
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Digitalization of the world economy
The world economy is increasingly electronically integrated and digital. Networks, and especially
transnational networks, are creatures of the information age held together by information technology.37
Computers, facsimile machines, high-resolution monitors, and the Internet are the “threads” of the global
web of the emerging electronically networked world economy.38
More important, markets are migrating from geographic space to cyberspace as electronic
commerce grows in both the business to business and business to consumer spheres. Last, and related to
the first two, physical products are becoming digital services, data transmitted electronically over the
Internet. (The increasing importantance of downloaded software or music in the MP3 format, provide
examples.) We are entering an era where information in the form of electronic cash will be routinely
exchanged for information in the form of a digital book, symphony, photograph or computer program. In
short, we face a dual revolution: the migration of markets from geographic space to cyberspace and the
morphing of products from real “atoms” to digital “bits.” Both render geographically defined national
markets and economic governance rooted in territorial jurisdiction problematic.
Thomas Malone and John Rockart argue that the electronics and information revolution has
resulted in a turn about, making extra-firm coordination cheaper and more efficient once again.39
Electronic information technology facilitates the integration of geographically dispersed operations and
allows networked coordination to replace ownership and hierarchy as a primary mode of control.40 One
result is the emergence of flexible networks replacing production by a single large firm. Hierarchical,
vertically integrated transnational firms have “fragmented” into “diverse” networks reintegrated through
information technology.41
There is widespread agreement that electronic information systems are critical to alliances.
Albert Bressand, Catherine Distler and Kalypso Nicolaidis, for example, argue that electronic networks
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play a central role in wealth creation as production and transactions merge into complex, information
intensive processes; networks are a manifestation of the blurring of the boundary between the factory and
the marketplace.42 Clarence Brown makes a similar point: as intra-firm integration increasingly depends
on electronic information technologies, modern manufacturing enterprises are coming to have a great deal
in common with information service firms.43 He notes that this applies to inter-firm links--to
subcontractors and customers--and that these linkages are rapidly becoming global in scope.
It is directly relevant that in 1995 Fortune combined the Industrial and Service “500,” arguing that
the new economy has virtually obliterated the distinction between industrial and service business. They
note the digital revolution has “dematerialized” manufacturing, citing one source claiming that threefourths of the value added in manufacturing is now information.44 All firms, regardless of sector, are
becoming information processors.
I have discussed the implications for national markets of the migration of markets to cyberspace
and the digitalization of products in detail elsewhere.45 One example will make the point here.
The Indian software industry is a dramatic example of a relatively poor country entering the global
economy, or to be more specific a segment of that country. The industry has grown at an annual rate of
50-69% through the 1990s. It is also export oriented with exports in 1998-99 totaling $2.65 billion and
estimated at $3.9 billion in 1999-00.46
Between 40 and 50% of software is exported directly over satellite or the Net. The vast majority
takes the form of services, upgrading systems, installing new programs and the like. Target markets are
often financial services and insurance companies in the U.S. and Europe. It is quite possible for an Indian
programmer in Banaglore to be working directly on a computer in a bank in New York City, installing a
new program or upgrading the system.
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That raises a question of interest: where did the transaction take place? It is far from clear which
“jurisdiction” gets to tax it, or whether it is an export or an import. There is a very real possibility that
national markets and territorial jurisdiction are not directly relevant when markets are constructed in
cyberspace. Geography and territorial jurisdiction do not map on cyberspace.
A NETWORKED WORLD ECONOMY
Increasingly, network metaphors are used to describe the emerging world economy: a shift from
standardized mass production to flexible production, from vertically integrated, large scale organizations
to disaggregation of the value chain and horizontally networked economic units.47 In Dunning’s terms,
hierarchical enterprises are being replaced by alliance capitalism.48
The information revolution is a critical factor in the emergence of networks as a mode of
organization of the world economy. Global networks are both real and virtual, in fact, many combine
elements of both. Thus, Castells argues that international networks of firms and subunits of firms are the
basic organizational form of the “informational/global” economy. That the “actual operating unit
becomes the business project, enacted by a network”.49
Similarly, UNCTAD reports that traditional oligopolies (industries with very concentrated market
structures) are being replaced by global knowledge-based network oligopolies.50 These knowledge-based
oligopolies share four interesting characteristics51: collaboration aims at generating new knowledge or
using or controlling its evolution; they are dynamic as collaboration focuses on shaping future boundaries
of an industry or technological trajectories; they are composed of networks of firms as alliances form the
basic building block of the global oligopoly; and they form across as well as within industries. (Data
processing networks which involve the merger of information and communications technology are given
as an example.)
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Ford, General Motors and Chrysler have announced and agreement to move virtually all of their
purchasing activity to the Internet. Covisint is an on-line business to business electronic commerce
network which will handle $80 billion in annual purchasing with more than 30,000 suppliers and
eventually, a $300 billion extended supply chain. As with other business to business networks, users will
be able to create marketplaces, take part in auctions and compete purchases “with the click of a
mouse.”52 By mid-2001, Covisint had grown to manage transactions which amounted to 13% of the
“Big Three’s” annual procurement.53
While global networks such as Covisint are revolutionary, they are but hybrid interim steps
towards true informational networks. As products are digitalized -- for example software, electronic
books and music-- global networks will involve exchanges of information for information, services for
various versions of electronic cash that take place entirely in cyberspace.54
The emergence of networks as a basic mode of organization of international economic
transactions may be of more profound importance than increases in the scale of technology. It is
important to conceive of a networked world economy in terms of a complex web of transactions rather
than a series of dyadic or triadic cooperative arrangements between firms. A large multinational firm may
well be involved in tens if not hundreds of alliances linking various parts of its organization with others.
Dicken characterizes these webs as multilateral rather than bilateral and polygamous rather than
monogamous.55 I now turn to a brief theoretical discussion of networks before discussion the impact of a
networked global economy on economic and political organization.
Network forms of Organization
Strategic alliances and electronic networks represent a networked mode of organization of
international economic transactions which can distinguished from both trade (markets) and multinational
firms (hierarchies). Although there is general agreement that networks are a basic form of economic
14

organization, a central question, which is pertinent here, is whether “markets, hierarchies and networks
are discrete organizational alternatives employing distinctive control mechanisms or plural forms on a
continuum employing, price, authority and trust simultaneously”.56
Oliver Williamson includes hybrids or networks--”various forms of long-term contracting,
reciprocal trading, regulation, franchising and the like”--with markets and hierarchies as generic forms of
economic organization.57 He locates hybrids on a continuum between markets and hierarchies, the polar
modes of economic organization. Similarly, Wayne Baker argues that most real organizational forms fall
between market and hierarchy and suggests that they are an intermediate or hybrid form of interface.58
In a very influential article, however, Walter Powell argues against portraying economic
exchange as a continuum with markets and hierarchies at the poles and hybrids in between. Network
forms of organization--typified by reciprocal patterns of communication and exchange--represent a
distinctive mode of coordinating economic activity and economic organization.59
Similarly, an OECD report concludes that networks are a distinctive form of economic
organization and the “notion of the continuum fails to capture the complex realities of know-how trading
and knowledge exchange in innovation. Networks...represent a type of arrangement with its own specific
distinctive features which henceforth must be considered in its own right”.60
Networks have been described as “social units with relatively stable patterns of relationships over
time”.61 Networks differ from markets in the assumption of longer term, sequential transactions and from
hierarchies in the absence of an authoritative control relationship. Networks are a social form of
exchange, “… more dependent on relationships, mutual interests and reputation… network forms of
exchange… entail indefinite, sequential transactions within the context of a general pattern of
interaction”62
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Networks have a number of characteristics that affect the nature of international integration and
interdependence. First, they are a form of “collective action” involving cooperative relationships in which
the actors implicitly agree to forego the right to pursue their own interests at the expense of others.63
Network linkages entail relationships over time rather than individual or “spot” transactions; given longer
term reciprocity, trust becomes critical. Network relationships are inherently or “implicitly”
interdependent.64
Second, networks do violence to the idea of formal boundaries; vertical, horizontal and spatial.65
It becomes difficult if not impossible to define organizational boundaries, to establish where one firm
stops and another begins. At best, borders are blurred and ambiguous; more realistically they become
conceptually irrelevant.66
Last, networks are relational, individual attributes are less important than position in determining
organizational power and outcomes. “From a network perspective, variations in the actions of actors
(and the success or failure of these actions) can be better explained by knowing the positions of actors
relative to others… than by knowing how their attributes differ from one another.”67 Thus power is a
function of position in the network; as a corollary, networks have no center.
If networks are significantly different from both markets and hierarchies, trade, multinational firms
and alliances (both virtual and real) represent distinct modes of organization of international economic
transactions. Trade involves production by national firms in national markets linked by “arms length”
spot exchanges, typically of raw materials, commodities and finished goods. MNEs internalize
production: the firm’s administrative hierarchy becomes the primary mode of organization of the
international economy. In the integrated international firm, the exchange of intermediate goods through
intra-industry and intra-firm trade becomes increasingly important.
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The emergence of global networks signals the replacement of integrated transnational hierarchies
by a cooperative and reciprocal organization of economic transactions. The basic unit and venue of
production become ambiguous; indeed there is a real question about the appropriateness of these terms.
The most important flows across transnational networks are intangible: knowledge and information.
Although the periods overlap and are approximate, trade was the primary mode of integration of
the international economy from the late nineteenth century through the first two post-World War II
decades, the internationalization of production through MNEs from the mid 1960s until the mid 1980s,
and alliances or networked integration emerged in the late 1980s. Two caveats are important. First, I am
not proposing a “stage theory” of international integration, but rather am concerned with changes in the
dominant mode over time. Second, reality is complex and messy and there are large sectors of every
economy where production has remained entirely national and “networks” are confined to television and
job seekers.
GLOBALIZATION, NATIONAL MARKETS AND NATION STATES
I have argued that a global economy differs in kind from the international economy which
preceded it in three critical and inter-related respects. First, in many industries the scale of technology
has driven the minimal size of markets well beyond that encompassed by even the largest national
markets. Second, in many of these same industries electronically integrated networks are replacing
hierarchies as the most important mode of organization of international economic transactions. Last,
given the digitalization of the world economy and the emergence of the Internet, markets are migrating
from geographic space to cyberspace. All of these trends have significant impacts on the Westphalian,
territorial, organization of economics and politics.
In the nineteenth century, all production took place in discrete national markets which were linked
through cross-border trade and portfolio investment. Although levels of interdependence were high and
17

policy autonomy constrained, the national market was the basic unit in the international system. As noted
above, the very use of the term international implies the existence of discrete and meaningful territorially
defined national economic (and political) units.
In contrast, at the dawn of the twenty-first century national markets are losing meaning as the
discrete units of the world economy as the scale of technology is fusing them into a larger whole. The
transition to electronic networks and to cyberspace also affects the structure of the world economy.
Networks are inherently interdependent, do violence to all sorts of boundaries and are constructed
relationally so that the concept of a center may lose meaning.
As Castells so aptly notes, positions in the international division of labor no longer coincide with
countries, “they are organized in networks and flows, using the technological infrastructure of the
informational economy.”68 In a similar vein, Hirst and Thompson depict national economies being
subsumed and rearticulated into the global system, and argue that the international economy is becoming
autonimized.69
National borders are not irrelevant. Nation states have differing interests and objectives and
attempt to enforce their will on firms and other governments; national boundaries still “create significant
differentials on the global economic surface”.70 The critical point, however, is that globalization implies
that the national economy is no longer the unit of economic accounting or the frame of reference for
economic strategies.71
Globalization may well represent a return to an earlier stage in the evolution of the capitalist
world economy. Hobsbawm argues that in contrast to the past three hundred years when production
was local and the world economy was based on territorially defined national economies, the current
phase of development is marked by the reemergence of transnational elements.72 “The national economy
is no longer the building block of the world economy, but has a rival in the immediately global market
18

which can be supplied directly by firms capable of organizing their production and distribution in principle
without reference to state boundaries...”
Authority, Sovereignty, and the Geographic Order
Robert Keohane observes that sovereignty is typically discussed rather than defined.73 Formal
sovereignty is a legal concept implying supremacy within a territory and independence of outside
authorities in the exercise of state authority. In contrast, autonomy and effectiveness are political
constructs; the former implies that a state can and does make its own decisions with regard to internal
and external issues and the latter is a measure of the extent to its purposes are achieved.
Internal sovereignty entails legitimization of the state vis-a-vis competing domestic claimants. It
conceptualizes the state in the Weberian sense as having an effective monopoly of force over a territory
and population, the “...undisputed right to determine the framework of rules, regulations and policies
within a given territory and to govern accordingly”.74
External sovereignty involves the basic principles on which the modern interstate order is based.
The division of the political order into fixed, territitorially defined and mutually exclusive enclaves and
mutual recognition that each state represents a specific society within an exclusive domain.75 In fact,
Hendrik Spruyt argues that a primary explanation for the spread of sovereign territorial institutions was
that respective jurisdictions, and thus limits to authority, could be specified precisely through agreement
on fixed borders.76 In the Westphalian system, states are assumed to be the only legitimate sources of
political authority.
In examining the impact of globalization on markets, states and the state system one must
separate analytically constraints imposed on autonomy, effectiveness or capacity from impacts on formal
sovereignty. Two sets of questions need to be asked. First, are the constraints that globalization imposes
on state autonomy qualitatively different from those resulting from the interdependence associated with
19

an international or cross-border world economy? If so, at what point do constraints on state autonomy
compromise formal internal sovereignty? Second, will the emergence of an electronically networked
global economy compromise external sovereignty: the idea of territoriality itself as a mode of economic
and political organization? I believe the second question to be, by far, the most important.
Globalization and Autonomy
State autonomy has never been absolute and decision making power has always been constrained
by international economic transactions; the trade-off between the efficiency gains from cross-border
economic activity and autonomy is far from new. The problem facing governments has always been
“how to benefit from international exchange while maintaining as much autonomy as possible”.77
What is new this time around? Even if one grants that flows of trade and investment are greater
in both absolute and relative terms in 2000 than in 1900 and there is “more” interdependence (however
measured), that is still only a quantitative difference. Why should globalization have a qualitatively
different impact on state autonomy? Does globalization -- taken in terms of the phenomena discussed in
this paper -- render a state’s ability to exert auhtority over its economy and over economic actors more
problematic?
Participation in an international economy has always presented states with a trade-off between
efficiency and a loss of autonomy, and in many instances governments have chosen to preserve the latter.
Without judging their economic merit, in opting for import substitution policies such as forcing local
production of automobiles, policy makers were willing to trade-off higher local costs for automobiles
(reduced efficiency) for the promise of a more developed industrial capability and increased future
autonomy.
That option is not available in industries such as telecommunications, pharmaceuticals,
semiconductors, and aerospace where even the largest national markets are too small to support the
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research and development efforts needed to remain competitive. If transnational markets are an absolute
requisite of continued technological innovation, governments face a discrete zero-one decision rather than
a continuous, marginal trade-off. Accepting higher costs (e.g., lower efficiency) for some degree of
autonomy is not a realistic possibility; mutual dependence is inevitable and breaking its bonds implies a
degree of withdrawal that few states could tolerate. The choice is to compete transnationally or forego
the next generation of microprocessors, pharmaceuticals or telecommunications technology entirely.
At a minimum, states must allow their firms to participate in global markets. While in theory
governments could participate in the global economy while closing their borders to participation by
others, that option is not be viable in practice. At least in these strategic industries, independence or
autonomy is a very limited option. State or public authority is compromised.
At this point in many high technology industries, participating in the global economy implies
participating through alliances and cooperative efforts. As Zacher notes, “[states] are becoming
increasingly enmeshed in a network of interdependencies and regulatory and/or collaborative
arrangements from which exit is generally not a feasible option”.78
Alliances and other forms of global networks also constrain states’ability to control economic
actors through territorial jurisdiction. At this point, the vast majority of MNCs are responsive to their
headquarters government; even the most international have a clear center in terms of operations and
management. That is not the case for alliances and the emerging knowledge-based networked oligopolies
discussed earlier. They are diffuse and often relational: it is far from clear, for example, whether the
American, German or Japanese government could exert substantial regulatory control over the IBMSiemens-Toshiba alliance to develop chips. Where are strategic alliances “centered”?
In an electronically networked global economy the borders of national markets, the concept of
territoriality itself, and the distinction between the domestic and international economy (or domestic and
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international policy) become problematic. In Being Digital, Nicholas Negroponte makes a nice
distinction between trade in atoms and trade in bits.79 Atoms take the form of tangible material which
must cross borders physically and can be controlled by political authorities. Bits, on the other hand, are
transmitted electronically, typically by satellite, which renders the borders of national markets virtually
meaningless.
If software is imported in the form of disks and manuals it is subject to border controls, tariffs and
the like. However, if it is transmitted digitally--downloaded from the Internet, for example--any sort of
control becomes problematic and autonomy is directly constrained. As noted above, the Indian software
industry has evolved from sending Indian programmers abroad to work at a client’s site (known as
“body-shopping”) to satellite linkages through which programmers physically situated in India work
directly on the client’s host computer, wherever in the world it is located.80 If an Indian programmer
located in New Delhi edits a program on a computer in New York there is no question that economic
value has been created. It is far from clear, however, whether the transaction took place in India or the
U.S. and thus, which jurisdiction gets to tax it or control it. Furthermore, neither government may actuall
know that this sort of transaction took place.
In her last book, Susan Strange argued that states are losing authority, in part to markets and
MNEs, and in part to other actors in the international system.81 That the authority of governments of all
states has weakened as result of technical and financial change and of integration of national economies
into one single global market economy. As noted in the introduction to this volume, as states’authority
has weakened, a growing number of other actors have taken on authoritative roles in the international
political system. These sources of “private authority include amorphous “actors” such as global financial
markets and specific actors such as MNEs, both individually and collectively. They also include the rising
number of NGOs and other civil society groups active in international politics.
22

The question remains, however, at what point do constraints on state autonomy affect formal
sovereignty? As Geoffrey Goodwin puts it, “...whether the capacity of states to order their own internal
affairs and to conduct their own external policies has been so undermined or eroded as to make the
concept of state sovereignty increasingly irrelevant in practice despite its persistence in legal and
diplomatic convention.”82 Although this question is not immediately answerable, it is none the less,
critically important.
External sovereignty and territoriality
All forms of political organization occupy geographic space. However, that does not mean that
they are territorial, systems of rule “predicated on and defined by fixed territorial parameters”.83 The
distinguishing characteristic of the modern state is that it is territorial, and that of the modern state system
that it organizes geographic space. As James Anderson notes:
“Modern states...are all territorial in that they explicitly claim, and are based on, particular
geographic territories, as distinct from merely occupying geographic space which is true of
all social organizations...territory is typically continuous and totally enclosed by a clearly
demarcated and defended boundary...”84
What makes the modern state system historically unique is this “differentiation” into “territorially
defined, fixed and mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate dominion”.85 Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk
argue that the first function of the sovereign state was the organization of space and that the spatial
qualities of the state “is integral to the notion of sovereignty and international relations theory.”86 As
Ronald Deibert notes, what might be called “High Westphalia -- a condition of territorial exclusivity and
spatial differentiation” is what marks the modern period.87
The modern construction of economics is also inherently territorial; the market, national markets,
and even the international economy are geographic constructs. As noted above, national markets were
created by political authorities to territorialize economic activity.88
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In general, regional markets--the European Union is the best example--are motivated by the need
to expand the geographic bounds of national markets to increase efficiency in terms of specialization
and/or scale. An international economy, then, is comprised of national or regional economic spaces
linked through economic transactions; economic integration is the extension of a market in geographic
space.89 In part, globalization involves “deepening” or closer integration across national, regional and
global geographic spaces.90
An argument has been made that regardless of how international the world economy becomes, at
the end of the day all economic activity takes place within national boundaries.91 The implication is that
even the most integrated MNE does not alter the basic geographic structure of the world economy; any
given step in the production process or any given economic transaction can be located precisely in
geographic space and thus assigned unambiguously to a specific national territorial jurisdiction and
national market. While that argument may hold for a modern international economy, it is not necessarily
valid in a post-modern, electronically networked global economy.
There is nothing in the nature of markets that demands that they be defined spatially. In part, the
spatial definition of markets is a function of the stage of technological development, the need for physical
contact between buyers and sellers. In part, it is a result of the path of development of the modern
political-economic system. Many of the emerging global networks construct markets in electronic rather
than geographic space. The international financial system provides both the best current example and a
metaphor for the future.
The world financial market is not comprised of linked national markets; in fact, it is not comprised
of geographic locations at all. It is a network integrated through electronic information systems;
hundreds of thousands of electronic monitors in trading rooms all over the world linked together through
satellites.92 It is a system which is no longer nationally centered, “...in which national markets, physically
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separate, function as if they were all in the same place.” Global financial integration has been described
as “the end of geography“.93
If a trader in New York presses a key on her computer and buys German Marks in London, where
did the transaction take place? Chase Manhattan Corporation has built a center to process transactions
worth trillions of dollars each year in Bournemouth England linked by satellite to its offices in New York,
Hong Kong, Luxembourg and Tokyo. Would anyone argue that all of these “transactions” can be located
in the United Kingdom?94
The concepts of geographic space do not apply directly to cyber space. It is far from clear what
do jurisdictions and boundaries mean when markets take the form of information systems. One can
question whether all economic activity takes place within national boundaries or even whether economic
activity can occur in more than one place at the same time. At the end of the day, the real question is
whether the spatial concepts of borders, territory and jurisdiction apply to electronically organized global
networks.
The information revolution--the linking of telecommunications and computers--makes the very
idea of a market as a geographic construct obsolete; they have become global networks rather than
places.95 Ruggie suggests that a nonterritorial region is emerging in the world economy, “...a decentered
yet integrated space-of-flows...which exists along side the spaces-of-places that we call national
economies.” He goes on to note that in this nonterritorial region the distinctions between internal and
external become problematic.96
In summary, the very idea of a national market as an economic (or political) construct appears to
have lost meaning in the post-modern world economy. As Peter Dombrowski and Richard Mansbach
observe, “Markets are now effectively deterritorialized, and there is a growing incompatibility between
the political boundaries of states and the economic boundaries of markets.”97
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Given the emergence of electronic global networks, neither territoriality nor mutually exclusive
geographic organization retain relevance. The result has been to strip markets of both geographic and
political meaning. The net effect of both is to raise questions about the meaning of sovereignty -- at least
relative to economies and economic governance -- in its external sense of a system ordered in terms of
mutually exclusive territoriality.
Sovereignty and modernity cannot be separated. Both entail the unambiguous and mutually
exclusive ordering of space; both are profoundly geographic. Camilleri and Falk go so far as to claim that
“Sovereignty, both as an idea and an institution, lies at the heart of the modern and therefore Western
experience of space and time.”98
Both Gianfranco Poggi and Friedrich Kratochwil note a crisis of territoriality. The latter observes
that the fact that political systems are territorial and boundary maintaining and economic systems are not
affects the very core of the state as a political entity.99 It is to that asymmetry that I now turn.
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY
While one can certainly agree with Miles Kahler that international economic space seldom
coincides perfectly with political space, during the most of the twentieth century there was a rough
symmetry between politics and economics: both nation states and national markets have been bounded by
the same set of unambiguous borders and organized geographically.100 Nation states and national
markets, however, are but one of a number of historical modes of organizing political and economic
authority and, in historical terms, relatively short lived ones at that.101 It is not unreasonable to argue that
the symmetry between states and markets in both geographic scope and mode of organization--which we
tend to take as the natural order of things--is characteristic only of a very brief window of time: perhaps
the hundred years spanning the late nineteenth to late twentieth centuries.
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Martin Parker makes a nice distinction between post-modern as a historical period and
postmodern as a theoretical perspective (he uses the hyphen to distinguish between the two).102 Thus,
one can meaningfully talk about a modern or Westphalian political-economic system structured in terms
of unambiguous territorial jurisdiction or the transition from modern to post-modern organizations in
terms of the disintegration of “Fordist” vertically integrated hierarchical firms, without assuming a
postmodern epistemology.
At the start of the twenty-first century a post-modern global economy is situated in a political
system which is still grounded, at least conceptually, in modernity. As noted above, in many of the
industries now regarded as strategic, the minimal market size needed to support a competitive research
and development effort is larger than even the largest national markets, they are no longer the basic
structural unit of the global economy.
Perhaps of more fundamental importance, most of the concepts we use to understand
international politics are still organized in terms of territory and borders. Economic activity, on the other
hand, is increasingly organized in terms of electronic networks. The result is a developing asymmetry of
scope and mode of organization between a modern, territorially based and geographically organized
international political system comprised of nation states and an emerging post-modern world economy
where national markets, and indeed, the very concepts of territoriality and geography are becoming less
relevant.
That being said, two caveats are necessary. First, as will be discussed below, the international
political system is also in the midst of traumatic change. As is discussed elsewhere in this volume, nonstate and non-territorial actors are emerging which wield significant “private” political authority. Second,
neither the international nor the global world economy are all encompassing. Many sectors of economic
activity are still domestic and little affected by cross-border transactions, many others remain grounded in
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a cross-border or international economy. While the focus of this Chapter is on post-modern as an
historical period rather than postmodern as an epistemology, the simultaneous existence of domestic,
international and global economies would not be inconsistent with the latter.
BACK TO THE FUTURE103
Geoffrey de Joinville, a thirteenth century French medieval lord, acquired a considerable portion
of Ireland through a “strategic alliance.” His half-sister’s husband--the uncle of the Queen of England-arranged a marriage with Matilda, granddaughter of Walter de Lacy, Lord of Meath, who brought
substantial Irish lands with her.104 After his marriage, de Joinville owed simultaneous allegiance to the
Kings of England and France.
As E.H. Carr argued many years ago, it is difficult for contemporary observers to even imagine a
world in which political power is organized on a basis other than territory.105 However, neither de
Joinville’s fiefdoms nor the international financial market are modern, geographically based forms of
political or economic organization. Political control in one case and economic transactions in the other
are organized without regard to mutually exclusive geography or meaningful and discrete borders. To a
large extent both pre- and post-modern forms of organization are aterritorial.
Over twenty years ago Hedley Bull argued that the emergence of a modern and secular
counterpart of Western Christendom, with its characteristic overlapping authority and multiple loyalties,
was within the realm of possibility.106 The post-modern future may well resemble the medieval past more
closely--at least metaphorically--than the more immediate, geographically organized world of national
markets and nation states.
Although medieval “states” occupied geographic space, politics was not organized in terms of
unambiguous geography. Political authority took the form of hierarchical personal relationships, often
overlapping and intertwined mutual obligations and rights as de Joinville well illustrates. Borders were
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diffuse, representing a projection of power rather than a limit of sovereignty. In that context, power and
authority could not be based on mutually exclusive geography.
The Middle Ages lacked the singular relationship between authority and territory characteristic of
the modern era; geographic location did not determine identity and loyalty. Overlapping and competing
political authorities were the norm rather than the exception. At times, the spheres of pope, emperor,
prince and lord were all interwoven and comprised complex aterritorial networks of rival jurisdiction.
Citing other sources, John Ruggie (1983:274) describes the medieval system of rule in terms of a
“patchwork” of overlapping and incomplete rights of government which were “inextricably superimposed
and tangled.” He labels the medieval institutional framework heteronomous, connoting a “lattice-like
network of authority relations.” These overlapping, interwoven and incomplete systems of authority often
resulted in competing claims to the same geographic area.107
To assert singular territorial authority, early modern monarchs had to exert primacy over a
patchwork of dukedoms, principalities and other localized authorities as well as transnational institutions
such as the papacy, monastic and knightly orders. Until that was accomplished, the concept of an
unambiguous relationship between authority and territory was unknown.
Sovereignty--in its modern sense--is unambiguous political authority. The underlying idea of the
modern political system is exclusive authority over a discrete geographic space, which entails the absence
of both domestic competitors and extraterritorial superiors. It implies that the state is the ultimate
domestic authority and bows to no external power, be it pope or emperor.108
Singular territorially based authority is once more becoming problematic in our emerging
postmodern global political economy. States are no longer the sole sources of legitimate authority, in
fact we face a world of overlapping and ambiguous “authorities” which may shift as the context changes.
As noted above, MNEs and markets are one source of authority in the international system and NGOs
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and other civil society groups another. There are times when significant international political
negotiations have involved these two sets of actors with states on the sidelines.
An excellent example is the battle over the price of AIDS drugs in Africa and other poor regions
in late 2000 and the spring of 2001. After considerable negotiation and pressure from a variety of well
organized groups, the pharmaceutical companies offered to reduce dramatically the price of “AIDS
cocktails” in South Africa and a number of other African countries. What is of interest here is that the
primary negotiators were the private sector – pharmaceutical multinationals – and NGOs including
Doctors without Borders and a range of AIDS activists. The principal actors were private authorities
rather than states.109
While the medieval analogy has very obvious limits, the past may well contain applicable lessons
for the future. A neat, unambiguous ordering of economic and political authority along geographic lines
may no longer be the norm. Borders are diffuse and permeable, compromised by transnational integration
and global telecommunications. Relationships are increasingly networked rather than hierarchical with
both individuals and organizations enmeshed in complex, polygamous world-wide webs. Multiple and
competing loyalties result.
James Rosenau foresees the emergence of a dual system of sovereignty bound and sovereignty
free actors--or state centric and multicentric worlds--coexisting together. “The result is a paradigm that
neither circumvents nor negates the state-centric model but posits sovereignty-bound and sovereigntyfree actors as inhabitants of separate worlds that interact in such a way as to make their coexistence
possible”.110
One of the primary characteristics of modernity is a lack of ambiguity. The international political
system is structured in terms of discrete and mutually exclusive geography: disputed border areas aside,
every point in geographic space belongs unambiguously to a single nation state and market. With very
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few exceptions every individual under the law, including corporations, is a citizen of a single state.
Similarly, the essence of the modern integrated economic organization is a clear hierarchy and a single
chain of command: one boss, one company. Every individual, and every transaction, can be located in
organizational space.
We may well be at a point of transition comparable to what Ruggie describes as the “most
important contextual change in international politics in this millennium: the shift from the medieval to the
modern international system.”111 The emergence of an electronically networked global economy may
herald an analogous transition to a post-modern political-economic system.
There is, however, a danger in trying to project modern assumptions into a post-modern era.
Linearity or unrepeatable time is basic to modernity.112 We assume that time’s arrow is unidirectional and
that progress is irreversible; that there is an historic progression from classical to medieval to modern to-perhaps--post-modern. That assumption may be wrong.
THE STATE?
This chapter has argued that globalization will markedly constrain the autonomy and effectiveness
of states and, at a minimum, raise serious questions about the meaning of internal and external
sovereignty. One point should be clear: I am not claiming that the state will wither away or even be
rendered impotent. Rather, that globalization will affect the structure and functioning of both states and
the inter-state system.
At a minimum states will be still be responsible for any number of critical functions: for the
welfare of their citizens, for basic social and physical infrastructure and for insuring economic viability,
albeit in a very different context. Furthermore, while globalization will transform relatively large number
of critical, strategic sectors, it certainly does not affect all sectors, firms and individuals equally. There
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will still be firms that function as domestic actors and those that function in a more traditional
international or cross-border economy.
There is no question, however, that the meaning of sovereignty will evolve and that the state’s
role relative to supra- and sub-national actors will change. The medieval analogy is useful. It should be
clear at this point that I agree with Hirst and Thompson that the political order is becoming more
polycentric with states seen as “one level” in a very complex system of often overlapping and competing
agencies of governance.113 As discussed elsewhere in this volume, states are no longer the sole source of
political authority, private political authorities have emerged and coexist with public authorities in an
complex, interwoven and ambiguous relationship.
There is certainly some recognition of the need for some sort of control at the center. The World
Trade Organization (for example) has been given greater adjudication powers than its predecessor (The
GATT). Furthermore regional agreements such as the EU, NAFTA and ASEAN appear to be
proliferating. While the future of the EU is far from clear at this point, that fact that a common currency
is even on the table has major implications for state sovereignty.
At the same time, there appears to be increasing pressure for devolution of powers downwards to
sub-national entities, whether they are individual states in federal systems such as the United States or
regions within Europe. The situation is complicated further by the rise of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) as important actors in international politics; one thinks immediately of Greenpeace
in environmental politics or Amnesty International in human rights.
The modern system of political and economic organization may well have been an exception.
There is no reason to assume that a lack of geographic ambiguity, or even territoriality itself, is inherent
in the human condition.114 The post-modern era may well resemble the medieval in terms of ambiguity,
multiple loyalties, multiple levels of authority and the coexistence of multiple types of political and
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economic actors. It is certainly consistent with a post-modern world view to reject the “modernist
narrative of progress” and “embrace many simultaneously different and even contradictory accounts of
reality”.115
A medieval lord dealt with allegiances to multiple sovereigns, perhaps an emperor, and the
coexistence of secular and sacred authority as the norm. Is there any reason a post-modern could not
deal with sub-national, national, regional, international, civil society, and supra-national “authorities”
simultaneously? Or with multiple and ill-defined allegiances? Or with a system ordered on some basis
other than geography?
This chapter has argued that globalization entails the technologically driven expansion of the
scope of markets well beyond the limits of even the largest national territories, the replacement of
markets and hierarchies by relational networks as the mode of organization of international economic
transactions, and the migration of markets to cyberspace. Globalization signifies the emergence of a
post-modern world economy that is not consistent with a modern, territorially defined, international
political system. While the emerging asymmetry could be resolved by some sort of “world order,” that is
not likely in the foreseeable future. Modern economic and political actors will have to learn to deal with
the ambiguity and uncertainty of the post-modern future.
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